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Fair Truth and Fiduciary Duty: 
The Power of Corporate Shareholders to Make a Difference
By Michele Benedetto Neitz
Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law
September 9, 2011
I. Introduction
The power of the American consumer is well established.  Consumers wishing to 
encourage certain business practices may employ a variety of measures, including 
boycotts, advertising campaigns for or against a certain product, and lobbying efforts. 
While the strength of a fair truth label campaign may ultimately grow with the support of 
like-minded consumers, corporate shareholders represent another powerful group often 
unrecognized by consumer activists. 
Corporations owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders. For most publicly traded 
corporations, communication with shareholders takes place in the form of annual 
shareholder meetings.  As corporations become more powerful in American law and 
society, shareholders who wish to promote a specific cause are becoming more outspoken 
and influential in corporate shareholder meetings.  The result is a unique type of activist: 
the “cause shareholder.”  
This paper will examine the duties of publicly traded corporations to their shareholders, 
and analyze how these duties can empower shareholders to create social change.  As part 
owners of publicly traded companies, cause shareholders have a distinctive platform for 
sharing their concerns and encouraging corporate action.  For the fair truth label 
campaign, cause shareholders may provide a new avenue of activism: shareholders can 
pressure corporations from within to promote the fair truth label. 
II. The Roles of Shareholders in Publicly Traded Corporations
Corporations are creatures of state law.  Each state may draft its own corporate law 
statute, and the statutes differ in important areas.1  Regardless of these differences, most 
corporations are organized in a traditional manner.  The benefit of the corporate structure 
is that it permits a large number of people to share in the profits of the corporation, but is 
managed by a small, centralized group of agents known as the board of directors.2  
The board cannot complete each of these tasks themselves; in many cases, board 
members have “day jobs” with other companies.  Thus, the board hires officers to serve 
as the “actors,” full-time employees who will carry out the directives of the board.  The 
category of officers often includes a “CEO” (Chief Executive Officer), “CTO” (Chief 
Technical Officer) and “CFO” (Chief Financial Officer).  These individuals operate the 
corporation for its shareholders, who are the true “owners” of the corporation and will 
receive corporate profits in the form of dividends.  Shareholders hold the power to vote 
for directors; theoretically, any director who displeases shareholders may be voted out of 
office.
Despite the many benefits of the traditional corporate structure, some dangers exist.  The 
property of a large group of shareholders is essentially entrusted to a small number of 
directors and officers, and the potential for fraud or malfeasance is prevalent. High profile 
corporate scandals, such as the fall of Enron, illuminate the risks inherent in the corporate 
structure.3
1 For example, California allows shareholders to vote cumulatively, while Florida only permits cumulative 
voting if a corporation’s articles of incorporation specifically provide so. Compare Cal. Corp. Code § 708 
(2011) with Florida Code Title XXXVI, Business Organizations § 607.0101. 
2 The invention of the corporation enabled the creation of the modern business world.  As one scholar wrote 
in 1911, “I weigh my words when I say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest 
single discovery of modern times…Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited 
liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.” Nicholas Murray 
Butler, “Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York, November 16, 1911,” cited in The Kauffman Task Force on Law, Innovation and 
Growth, Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform (2011), available at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757982.
3 For an excellent analysis of the Enron scandal, see Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, THE SMARTEST 
GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
A. The Fiduciary Duty Concept
In an attempt to mitigate these dangers, corporate law statutes impose fiduciary duties on 
directors and officers.  A commonly cited definition of “fiduciary duty” provides: “A 
trustee [or corporate officer or director] is held to something stricter than the morals of 
the marketplace.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior.”4  
This broad term encompasses the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  These duties 
impose an obligation on directors and corporate officers to make decisions in an informed 
and carefully deliberated manner.5  Directors must also act in good faith and “in a manner 
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation.”6   Failure to 
follow these duties may result in personal liability for directors or corporate officers.7 
This potential liability is meant to discourage directors and officers from using their 
corporate powers for the benefit of anyone other than the corporation and its 
shareholders. 
B. The Property and Social Entity Models of the Corporation
Under traditional corporate law, directors and officers were charged with the task of 
making profits for the owners of the corporation: shareholders.  With profit maximization 
trumping all other goals, directors and officers were discouraged from considering 
constituencies other than shareholders, such as employees, creditors, consumers, or local 
citizens.  This traditional perspective has been identified as the “property model of the 
4 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
5Directors, or a committee of directors, “when becoming informed in connection with their decision-
making function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care 
that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.” Model 
Business Corporation Act § 8.30 (b) (2008).
6 Id. at § 8.30(a).
7 Id. at § 8.31.
public corporation.”8  Under this theory, any attempt by directors to spend money for a 
purpose other than maximizing profits is viewed as “agents spending other people’s 
money in pursuit of their own, perhaps eccentric, views of the public good.”9
The contrasting theory is the “social entity” model of the corporation, which provides that 
corporations have a public purpose meant to advance the welfare of society.10  Directors’ 
duties are not limited to profit enhancement, but also extend to all constituents affected 
by the corporation, including employees, consumers, and local citizens.11  Within this 
model, corporations are encouraged to consider more than just shareholder profits when 
making business decisions. The fair truth label campaign, which is incentivizing 
consumers to reward those corporations treating their employees and others in a fair 
manner, reflects the social entity perspective. 
Henry Ford articulated this viewpoint when he testified in 1919 that he intended to refrain 
from distributing Ford Motor Company’s profits as dividends to the company’s 
shareholders.  In a suit brought by those shareholders, Ford stated that his ambition was 
“to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest 
possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.”12  Ford lost the 
lawsuit when the court held, in accordance with the property model of the corporation, 
that the power of directors should be “carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.”13 
The Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. court’s opinion was doctrinally correct: the property model 
of the corporation was the traditional standard under American law.  Even so, the social 
entity model is gaining traction in the modern era.  This is particularly true given the 
rising populist anger toward corporations in our post-Enron, post-mortgage crisis 
economy.  With shareholders losing gains, employees losing jobs and consumers losing 
8 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 
264-5 (1992).
9 Id. at 268.
10 Id. at 271.
11 Id. at 271.
12 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 468 (1919).
13 Id. at 507.
confidence, American corporate directors can no longer depend on the passivity of 
shareholders to “rubber stamp” their business decisions.  Cognizant of the fiduciary 
duties owed to them by corporate managers, shareholders are becoming active and vocal 
dissenters in shareholders’ meetings and public forums.  These activist shareholders are 
speaking directly to corporate directors on a variety of topics, including executive 
compensation and transparency in corporate governance.14  For some shareholders, these 
meetings and forums also provide an opportunity to advance social causes, including—
potentially—a fair truth label campaign.
C. Cause Shareholders: A Case Study
The accomplishments of Sister Patricia Daly serve as an instructive example for fair truth 
advocates.  Sister Daly is a member of the Sisters of Saint Dominic of Caldwell, N.J.  She 
is also the executive director of the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment, a 
group of Catholic institutions from the New York area, and a member of the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility.15 
Sister Daly has dedicated her career to persuading Ford, G.M., Exxon-Mobil, and other 
American corporations to consider issues beyond shareholder profits.  Sister Daly is more 
than an advocate; she and her fellow nuns invest their pension funds in these publicly 
traded companies, and she is therefore a shareholder owner.16  Accordingly, corporate 
directors owe fiduciary duties to her.  Moreover, in her role as a part owner of these 
companies, Sister Daly has access to shareholder meetings.
Sister Daly uses this access to pressure companies to “take action on issues as varied as 
genetically modified organisms and health care for employees for HIV.”17  While she 
recognizes the duty of corporations to make profits (and indeed, “her own retirement 
14 Michael Reilly, The Return of Shareholder Activism, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2011), available at  
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-return-of-shareholder-activism-2011-3.
15 Dashka Slater, “Resolved: Public Corporations Shall Take Us Seriously,” THE NEW YORK TIMES (August 
12, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/magazine/12exxon-t.html.
16 Id.
17 Id.
depends on it,”), Sister Daly regularly brings proposals related to social causes to 
shareholder meetings.18  In 2007, she brought a greenhouse-gas-reduction proposal to 
ExxonMobil’s annual shareholder meeting.  Her efforts to convince the company to 
consider global warming matters included the argument that climate change is a risk to 
“nearly every sector of the economy.”19  As such, she argued, the company should 
consider the result of global warming on its long-term profits. 
Sister Daly’s proposal received 31 percent of the shareholder vote at the meeting.20 
Procedurally, her proposal cannot force the ExxonMobil executives to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.  However, the fact that her proposal was approved by 31 percent of the 
company’s shareholders indicates some measure of success.   Shareholders were now 
thinking about more than profits, and “to walk away with a third of the vote was just a 
remarkable win.”21
Sister Daly’s efforts are successful in part because of her perseverance.  She frequently 
communicates with corporate executives and attends shareholder meetings.  She expects 
directors to consider the sound economic reasoning of her social causes.  By asking 
directors to use their fiduciary responsibilities to act in the best interests of both 
companies and the broader society, Sister Daly represents the new “cause shareholder.”
Other shareholders are taking notice of this new social movement.  In fact, shareholder 
activists are bringing causes to the attention of corporate managers “nationwide, thanks to 
the fall of Enron, the rise of socially responsible investment funds, a new sense of 
mission on the part of institutional investors and an Internet-age impulse toward 
participatory democracy.”22   When shareholders speak, corporate directors increasingly 
listen.
18 Id. To learn more about the substance and procedure of shareholder proposals, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 
(2011).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. 
D. Fair Truth Activists as Cause Shareholders
This movement could provide a new stage for fair truth activists, who might further the 
fair truth label campaign by becoming cause shareholders in publicly traded companies. 
As part owners of these corporations, fair truth activists could have direct access to 
meetings, documents, and corporate managers.  More importantly, these managers would 
have fiduciary duties to shareholder activists.  While corporate directors may argue under 
the property model of the corporation that their duty is simply to maximize profits, Sister 
Daly’s work provides an example of the power of shareholders to motivate companies to 
consider social concerns as part of their economic goals.  
For example, fair truth activists have a strong financial argument that the fair truth label 
can help a company’s bottom line.  The fair truth label indicates to the public that a  
company pays a fair living wage to its employees and employs other “fair-truth good-
capitalism practices.”23  In this way, consumers can be informed about the social impact 
of their purchasing choices and can choose to buy products from fair truth companies. 
As this movement becomes more widespread, consumer demand may offset the costs of 
fair wages, sustainable manufacturing, and other fair truth principles.  Shareholder 
interest in this idea, as expressed through proposal votes at shareholder meetings, would 
encourage corporate directors to consider signing on to the fair truth label as a good 
business decision.
III. Conclusion
The rise of the cause shareholder signifies a convergence of the property model and 
social entity model of the corporation.  As a cause shareholder would argue, sometimes 
directors’ duties to shareholders may be fulfilled, long-term profit maximization may be 
realized, and society’s general welfare may improve—all as a result of a corporation 
“doing the right thing.”
23 See http://fairtruth.org/concept.php (last visited September 6, 2011).
The fair truth label campaign may be broadened through this developing social 
movement.  As active shareholders, fair truth activists would bring a new voice to 
shareholder meetings.  They could motivate corporations to recognize the strength of a 
fair truth label, and argue that corporations will benefit economically by signaling their  
fair truth commitment to consumers. Ultimately, the fair truth label campaign could 
represent a new way to merge corporate profits and fair labor practices.
